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State v. Pearson and State v. McClendon: Determining
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion from the Totality of the
Circumstances in North Carolina
The purpose of a "stop and frisk" is simple and rational: it allows
police officers investigating potential crimes to detain an individual
temporarily while assuring themselves that the detainee is not armed
and dangerous.' Despite the utility of such measures, however, law
enforcement officers' authority to conduct stops and frisks is in
constant tension with the Fourth Amendment, which protects
individuals from "unreasonable" governmental searches and
seizures. Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures
normally are permitted in two situations: (1) when a magistrate issues
a warrant in advance of the search and seizure; and (2) when a police
officer in the line of duty has probable cause to believe that criminal
activity is afoot and that a search is needed to protect the safety of the
officer Stops and frisks, in contrast, often occur on city streets in
"rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations"4 in which time
constraints render the issuance of warrants impractical,5 and the risk
of injury from concealed weapons makes waiting for probable cause
1. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968).
2. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to provide due
process); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57, 660 (1961) (incorporating Fourth
Amendment protections into the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee). The
principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is the exclusionary rule. See RONALD
J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7, at 604 (3d ed. 1995).
The rule operates to exclude evidence from trial that has been obtained illegally or
unconstitutionally through government actions. See id. The Supreme Court first
articulated this rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), and made it
applicable to Fourth Amendment cases in Mapp, 376 U.S. at 655.
3. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, § 7, at 625.
4. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
5. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,392-93 (1978) ("[A] warrantless search must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation' ...." (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 26)); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the
exigency stemming from "hot pursuit" of a suspect when probable cause existed justified a
warrantless search of house).
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to develop inordinately dangerous for police.6
In Terry v. Ohio,7 the United States Supreme Court responded to
police officers' need for safety and flexibility by recognizing a narrow
exception within the framework of Fourth Amendment case law.8
The Court held that stops and frisks without either warrants or
probable cause are nonetheless constitutional when police officers
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
and that the individuals involved in that activity are armed and
dangerous.9 This exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is commonly known as the Terry Doctrine.
The threshold phrase "reasonable, articulable suspicion" is not
self-defining0 and has caused confusion and disagreement in the
thirty years since Terry. State v. Pearson" and State v. McClendon,2
cases recently decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
highlight the difficulties in applying the Terry Doctrine. The cases
involved strikingly similar fact patterns, yet produced divergent
outcomes. The supreme court deviated from the traditional
application of the Terry Doctrine in Pearson, but attempted to restore
the application to its original, intended formula in McClendon. This
Note discusses North Carolina courts' application of the Terry
Doctrine in the context of these two cases.
First, this Note presents the facts of Pearson and McClendon,
including their procedural histories at trial and on appeal." The Note
then reviews the development of the Terry Doctrine at both the
federal and state levels. 4 Next, it addresses the differences between
the Pearson and McClendon decisions, with an emphasis on the
analyses of the cases in light of applicable precedent." Finally, the
Note recommends that the North Carolina courts take a more
consistent approach in applying the Terry Doctrine and in evaluating
the nervousness displayed by suspects during police stops in order to
avoid confusion in future judicial decisions.'6
6. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. See id at 9-10; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979)
(characterizing Terry as recognizing an exception to the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment).
9. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; id at 32-33 (Harlan, L, concurring).
10. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
11. 348 N.C. 272,498 S.E.2d 599 (1998).
12. 350 N.C. 630,517 S.E.2d 128 (1999).
13. See infra notes 17-84 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 85-127 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 128-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying note 179.
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The incident at issue in Pearson occurred in Greensboro, North
Carolina, on October 12, 1994, when Trooper Timmy Lee Cardwell
pulled over a vehicle on Interstate 85 after observing it travel below
the posted speed limit and weave within its lane. 17 Trooper Cardwell
approached the vehicle to speak with the driver, Clifton Harold
Pearson, Jr., and a female passenger. 8 Upon request, Pearson
produced a North Carolina driver's license and proper registration for
the automobile.' 9 Trooper Cardwell then asked Pearson to exit the
vehicle and accompany him back to the patrol car.20 At the patrol car,
Trooper Cardwell noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from
Pearson 2 He also observed that Pearson was nervous and had a
rapid heart rateYl In response to questions concerning these
conditions, Pearson admitted to having consumed "a couple of
beers" 3 and stated that he had barely slept the night before.2 4
Pearson then explained that he and the passenger, his fianc6e, had
made a trip from Charlotte to his parents' house near the Virginia
border the day before and were now on their way home.' After
questioning Pearson, the trooper left him in the patrol car and spoke
with Pearson's fianc6e, who was still in the couple's car.26  Her
statement was similar to Pearson's, except that she said the couple
had visited the defendant's parents in New York?7
Trooper Cardwell then returned to his patrol car and radioed
Trooper W.J. Gray for assistance.? Trooper CardwelU issued Pearson
a warning ticket and asked him if he would consent to a search of his
vehicle.2 9 Pearson assented and signed a consent form.30  At this
point, approximately ten minutes had passed since Pearson and his
fianc6e had been pulled over.3' Trooper Gray soon arrived and, upon
request from Trooper Cardwell and in accordance with departmental
17. State v. Pearson, 125 N.C. App. 676, 678, 482 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1998), rev'd, 348 N.C.
272,498 S.E.2d 599 (1998).
18. See id
19. See id
20. See iL
21. See id.
22. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274,498 S.E.2d at 599.
23. Pearson, 125 N.C. App. at 678,482 S.E.2d at 17.
24. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274,498 S.E.2d at 599-600.
25. See Pearson, 125 N.C. App. at 678,482 S.E.2d at 17.
26. See id.
27. See Ud
28. See id.
29. See &L
30. See id.
31. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274,498 S.E.2d at 600.
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standard procedure,32 frisked Pearson while Cardwell searched the
suspect's vehicle.33 Pearson did not object to the frisk,' but seemed
"very nervous and excited." 35  During the frisk, Trooper Gray
discovered a large, hard, foreign object in Pearson's pants, which he
immediately suspected to be narcotics. 6 The troopers removed the
object,37 which consisted of several bags of cocaine and marijuana
wrapped in fabric softener strips.38
At trial, Pearson filed a motion to suppress the drugs as
evidence.39  The trial court denied the motion,40 and Pearson
subsequently was convicted on two counts of drug trafficking.41 On
appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously held that
the frisk was a proper and reasonable protective search justified by
the facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop.42 The court
of appeals pointed to the following circumstances in arriving at its
conclusion that there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify
the frisk: (1) the defendant smelled of alcohol; (2) he appeared
nervous while talking with Trooper Cardwell; (3) he continued to
appear nervous and excited when Trooper Gray arrived; and (4) the
defendant and his fianc6e gave inconsistent explanations about their
travels.43
32. Trooper Cardwell stated that it was standard procedure to pat down all suspects,
for safety reasons, every time he searched a vehicle. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress
at 10, Pearson, State of North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division,
Guilford County (No. 94 CRS 68468-69).
33. See iL
34. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601. The Superior Court of Guilford
County relied on this failure to object in finding that the defendant had consented to the
frisk, thereby waiving his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures. See id The North Carolina Court of Appeals did not address the issue of
consent or waiver, holding instead that the search was justified under the circumstances.
See Pearson, 125 N.C. App. at 679, 482 S.E.2d at 18. The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, held that Pearson had not waived his constitutional rights because he had
consented only to a search of his vehicle. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601;
see also infra note 49 (discussing Pearson's consent to the search of his vehicle).
35. Pearson, 125 N.C. App. at 678,482 S.E.2d at 17.
36. See id at 679, 482 S.E.2d at 17.
37. See id
38. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274-75, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
39. See id at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
40. See id In deciding the motion, the court focused on the signed consent form and
the fact that the defendant did not object to the frisk. See id These factors, in the trial
court's opinion, were sufficient to show that the defendant freely and voluntarily
consented to the search. See id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
41. See Pearson, 125 N.C. App. at 677,482 S.E.2d at 17.
42. See id at 679, 482 S.E.2d at 18.
43. See id. Although Trooper Cardwell did not articulate it in any court record, his
suspicion of Pearson may have been based on Pearson's fianc6e's statement that the
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In Pearson, the North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the court of appeals' decision.44 The supreme court's
opinion separately addressed and refuted the significance of nearly
every circumstantial factor examined by the court of appeals in its
holding that the frisk was justified by a reasonable suspicion.45
Specifically, the supreme court noted that: (1) Pearson had not
consumed enough alcohol to be considered impaired; (2) his
nervousness could be explained as a common reaction to being
stopped by the police; (3) he was stopped at 3:00 p.m. on an interstate
highway;46 (4) Pearson was polite and cooperative; (5) the troopers
were not aware of any criminal record of the defendant; (6) the object
in the defendant's pants was not obvious prior to the frisk; (7) the
defendant was held for more than ten minutes without making any
movements or statements indicating that he was armed; (8) the
discrepancy in the statements from the defendant and his fianc6e did
not by itself show any criminal activity; and (9) the troopers
conducted the pat-down search because it was "standard
procedure." 47  According to the court, all nine of these factors
indicated that the troopers were not acting upon any specific,
reasonable suspicion.' The court, therefore, concluded that the
troopers were not justified in frisking Pearson.49
couple was returning from New York, a known source city for drugs. See id.; see also
Joseph P. D'Ambrosio, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable
Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 NOVA L. REV. 273, 275-76 n.22 (1987) (citing
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980) (noting New York as a drug source
city)); Carl Horn, For the Criminal Practitioner: Review of Fourth Circuit Opinions in
Criminal Cases Decided in Calendar Year 1993, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 159, 164 (1993)
(citing United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1192 (4th Cir. 1993) (same)); Diane-
Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the War on
Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219,230 (1992) (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562 (same)).
44. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 277,498 S.E.2d at 601.
45. See id. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
46. The court apparently noted the time and location of the stop to show that neither
was suspicious. Cf. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 440, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (noting
the time of an incident-3:00 a.m.-as a factor in determining the existence of reasonable
suspicion for an investigative stop of a vehicle); State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 208, 195
S.E.2d 502, 507 (1973) (stating that the defendant's activities justified a pat down partly
because of the time of night-2:45 a.m.); State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 168, 415
S.E.2d 782, 784 (1992) (using the time of the observation of suspects-12:00 a.m.-as a
factor contributing to articulable grounds for suspecting criminal activity). But cf Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (noting that the incident in which a reasonable, articulable
suspicion was held to exist took place at about 2:30 in the afternoon).
47. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276,498 S.E.2d at 601.
48. See id.
49. See ic. The court then examined the superior court's holding regarding Pearson's
consent to the search. The supreme court held that, in signing the form presented by
Trooper Cardwell, Pearson only consented to a search of his car and not to a search of his
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The underlying facts in State v. McClendon are remarkably
similar to Pearson, although McClendon focused on the
constitutionality of an extended investigatory stop rather than on the
legality of a frisk. Paul Dennis McClendon was also pulled over on
Interstate 85 in Greensboro Trooper Cardwell, the same officer
involved in Pearson, ordered another officer, Trooper Brian Lisenby,
to stop McClendon's vehicle after seeing McClendon speed and
follow another car quite closely." Trooper Cardwell suspected the
two vehicles were traveling in tandem, with the lead car acting as a
decoy for McClendon's car. 2 While Trooper Cardwell pulled over
the lead car, Trooper Lisenby stopped McClendon and asked him to
produce his license and registration. 3 McClendon did not produce a
registration card, but instead provided a title.5 Although the title
showed the same address as McClendon's driver's license, it was in
the name of a different person.55 McClendon explained that the car
belonged to his girlfriend, but when asked her name, he did not
respond. 6 Trooper Lisenby then asked McClendon if he was
traveling with the other vehicle, and McClendon claimed that he was
not.57 Throughout this conversation, Trooper Lisenby noticed that
McClendon was acting nervous-breathing heavily, fidgeting, and not
making eye contact with the trooper. When Trooper Lisenby again
asked the defendant for his girlfriend's name, he responded "Anna."59
Lisenby asked "Anna?" to confirm the name, and McClendon
replied, "I think so." 6 The name Anna, however, did not appear on
the title.6'
person. See id. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 601. The court also concluded that Pearson's lack of
objection to the personal frisk did not rise to the level of the "clear and unequivocal"
consent required to waive Fourth Amendment rights. Id. (citing State v. Little, 270 N.C.
234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967)); see also Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) ("The Government must show a consent that is 'unequivocal and specific.'"
(quoting Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1932))).
50. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 632, 517 S.E.2d at 130.
51. See id. at 633,517 S.E.2d at 130.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 633,517 S.E.2d at 130.
55. See id. at 633, 517 S.E.2d at 130-31.
56. See id at 633, 517 S.E.2d at 130.
57. See id, at 633,517 S.E.2d at 131.
58. See id. at 633, 517 S.E.2d at 130.
59. Id. at 633,517 S.E.2d at 131.
60. State v. McClendon, 130 N.C. App. 368, 371, 502 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1998), affd, 350
N.C. 630,517 S.E.2d 128 (1999).
61. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 633, 517 S.E.2d at 131. The name appearing on the
title was Jema Ramirez. See id.
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Trooper Lisenby then radioed Trooper Cardwell, who ordered
Lisenby to issue McClendon a warning ticket.62 After doing so,
Lisenby asked McClendon if he had any drugs or weapons in the car
and if he would consent to a vehicle search.63 McClendon refused,
and Lisenby related the refusal to Cardwell, who had since arrived at
the scene of McClendon's stop.' Cardwell then began questioning
the suspect, asking him questions regarding his travel plans. 5
Cardwell also noticed McClendon's nervousness. 6 6 McClendon stated
that he had spent a few days in Houston, the same city of origin as the
suspected decoy vehicle.67 Based on these circumstances, Cardwell
radioed for a drug dog to perform an external sniff of the vehicle.'
The canine unit arrived approximately fifteen minutes later, and,
based on the dog's sniffing, the officers believed they had probable
cause to search the car.69 They found marijuana and arrested
McClendon. 0
At trial, McClendon filed a motion to suppress the results of the
search7' and argued that the original traffic stop was invalid, that the
length of the stop subsequent to the issuance of the warning ticket
was unreasonable, and that the stop was not based on a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.72 The trial court
held an extensive suppression hearing, drawing out the circumstances
of the stop in great detail over several days.7' Eventually, the trial
court held that the troopers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
both to stop the vehicle and to detain McClendon after issuing the
warning ticket.74 McClendon was convicted of trafficking and
conspiring to traffic marijuana, sentenced to twenty-five to thirty-five
62. See id, at 634, 517 S.E.2d at 131.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 371-72,502 S.E.2d at 904.
66. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 634,517 S.E.2d at 131.
67. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 370-72, 502 S.E.2d at 903-04; Transcript of
Motion to Suppress at 300, McClendon, State of North Carolina General Court of Justice,
Superior Court Division, Guilford County (Nos. 96 CRS 22468, 96 CRS 28944, 96 CRS
28945).
68. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 634,517 S.E.2d at 131.
69. See id.
70. See iL
71. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 369,502 S.E.2d at 903.
72. See id. at 374-76, 502 S.E.2d at 906-07; Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 254-
56, McClendon.
73. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 369-74, 502 S.E.2d at 903-06; Telephone
Interview with Walter L. Jones, Attorney for Paul Dennis McClendon, Jr. (Oct. 1,1999).
74. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 372,502 S.E.2d at 905.
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months in prison, and fined $15,000.71
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the period of questioning after the issuance of the warning ticket
exceeded the scope of a normal traffic detention, but nonetheless
held that the additional detention was based on a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.76 The court based its
decision on Trooper Cardwell's stated suspicion that criminal activity
was underway77 and on the supporting articulated facts, including the
defendant's nervousness, his uncertainty and confusion regarding his
girlfriend's name, his inability to produce the vehicle's registration
card, and the troopers' suspicion that McClendon was traveling in
tandem with the other vehicle.78 The court stated that "[w]hile any
one of the enumerated factors alone may not be sufficient to show a
reasonable suspicion ... we conclude, based on the totality of the
circumstances here, the detention [was constitutional]. 79  Judge
Wynn dissented, arguing that nervousness and inconsistent or vague
responses by drivers or passengers do not give rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 0
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the police had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that McClendon was engaged in
criminal activity based on the totality of circumstances, but the court
focused most of its attention on McClendon's nervousness and on his
uncertainty regarding his girlfriend's name and the car ownership.81
Notably, much of the supreme court's analysis was devoted to
explaining and distinguishing its holding in Pearson regarding the
consideration of nervousness in Terry Doctrine analyses.82 The court
reiterated and reviewed the McClendon trial court's extensive
75. See id. at 369,502 S.E.2d at 903.
76. See id. at 378, 502 S.E.2d at 908.
77. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 108, McClendon (noting Trooper
Cardwell's belief that McClendon was traveling in tandem with another vehicle that was
acting as a decoy and that the two were involved in criminal activity).
78. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 378-79,502 S.E.2d at 908; Transcript of Motion
to Suppress at 299-300, McClendon.
79. McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 378,502 S.E.2d at 908.
80. See id. at 379, 502 S.E.2d at 909 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (relying on State v. Pearson,
348 N.C. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 601, and State v. Falana, 129 N.C. App. 813, 816-17, 501
S.E.2d 358, 360 (1998), to argue that no reasonable, articulable suspicion existed). The
only difference between Pearson and McClendon, in Judge Wynn's opinion, was
McClendon's inability to produce a vehicle registration. See id. (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Judge Wynn, however, believed the lack of a registration card was resolved adequately by
McClendon's production of the vehicle's title matching his own address. See id. (Wynn, J.,
dissenting).
81. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 637,517 S.E.2d at 133.
82. See id at 637-39,517 S.E.2d at 133-34.
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findings during the suppression hearing, specifically noting
McClendon's physical appearance and behavior.8 The court then
stated that the nervousness displayed by the defendant in Pearson
was "not remarkable," while McClendon "exhibited more than
ordinary nervousness. '
The detailed fact-based analyses used by the North Carolina
courts in Pearson and McClendon date back to the United States
Supreme Court's first decision recognizing the legality of frisks even
under circumstances that do not satisfy the previously articulated
Fourth Amendment standard. In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer
observed two men "casing" a downtown Cleveland retail store in the
middle of the afternoon.' The officer testified that he believed the
men were planning a robbery and feared that they were armed.86
When the officer approached them and asked for their names, the
men did not answer clearlyY The officer then grabbed John Terry,
frisked him, and found a gun in his overcoat.! At trial, Terry filed a
motion to suppress the gun as evidence, claiming the officer did not
have the requisite probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to
frisk him.89
Prior to Terry, the Fourth Amendment had been interpreted to
require probable cause to justify any governmental search or
seizure." Accordingly, previous cases involving Fourth Amendment
search and seizure issues had often focused on whether particular
police actions constituted "searches" or "seizures."'91 Commentators
have referred to this categorical analysis as the "monolithic"
approach to the Fourth Amendment.' In other words, the Fourth
Amendment analysis was rigid-if a police action was considered a
83. See id. at 639, 517 S.E.2d at 134.
84. Id.
85. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
86. See id
87. See id. at 7.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 8.
90. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1979) (discussing the historical
development of Fourth Amendment case law).
91. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1967); United States v.
Pasquinzo, 334 F.2d 74,75 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Lee, 308 F.2d 715, 717 (4th Cir.
1962).
92. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 388 (1974) ("The fourth amendment ... is ordinarily treated as a monolith
."); Christo Lassiter, The Stop and Frisk of Criminal Street Gang Members, 14 NAT'L
BLACK L.J 1, 17 (1995) (stating that Terry "broke the monolith" of Fourth Amendment
analysis by recognizing constitutional limitations on searches based upon reasonable
suspicion).
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search or seizure, the absence of either a warrant or probable cause
created a constitutional violation; the reasonableness of the search
under the specific circumstances did not matter. In Terry, however,
the majority's opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, shifted away
from the monolithic analysis and adopted a graduated, or "sliding
scale," 93 approachY4 The majority held that the extent of the Fourth
Amendment's protections depends upon the context of each incident
and the reasonableness of the government's action within that
context.95 Consequently, the Court ruled that police may frisk a
93. Amsterdam, supra note 92, at 390 (pointing to Terry v. Ohio as an example of a
case in which the Supreme Court took a sliding scale approach to analyzing an alleged
Fourth Amendment violation). "Sliding scale" refers to the concept that the degree of
suspicion developed by a police officer should correlate to the degree of the officer's
intrusion upon the suspect's privacy. See id. at 390-93.
94. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1690-91 (1998) (stating that although the
Terry Court held that stops and frisks are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, it
relaxed the normal demands of the Amendment by applying a reasonableness balancing
test instead of requiring probable cause); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren
Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 891,
900 (1998) (noting that the Warren Court created a "sliding scale" exception to the
existing probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment); Wayne R. LaFave,
Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of
Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 442, 470(1990) (explaining that the Terry Court acknowledged that brief street stops are
sometimes permissible even when there are no grounds for a formal arrest because the
stops are much less intrusive than stationhouse detentions).
95. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("Of course, the specific content and
incidents of this [Fourth Amendment] right must be shaped by the context in which it is
asserted. For 'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960))).
The Terry Court approached the Fourth Amendment issue with some degree of
trepidation. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, explained, "We would be less
than candid if we did not acknowledge that this [Fourth Amendment] question thrusts to
the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity-
issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court." Terry, 392 U.S. at
9-10. The difficulties apparently were amplified by the public's interest in police activities
at the time. The Court noted that there had been "practical and constitutional arguments
pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to
'stop and frisk'... suspicious persons." Id. at 10. The opinion acknowledged the need for
police to be able to act swiftly in certain situations based on observations made in the
field. See id. at 20. But the Court thought it was "fantastic" to say that a frisk performed
by a police officer in public, while the citizen "assumes the position," is a "petty indignity."
Id at 16-17. Instead, the Court held that while the Fourth Amendment governs and limits
intrusions by the government into personal privacy, it also permits the police to conduct
limited, reasonable searches or frisks. See id. at 17, 21. The Court reasoned that the
central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is not whether an activity rises to the level
of a "search" or "seizure," but rather whether the government's invasion of the person's
privacy is reasonable. See id. at 19; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text
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suspect when a reasonably prudent police officer would be justified in
believing that the suspect is armed. 6 The belief must be based on
"specific reasonable inferences" that officers are "entitled to draw
from the facts in light of [their] experience." The Court, however,
noted the serious nature of such police actions, characterizing a frisk
as "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly."98
Significantly, Terry left unresolved the relation between stops
and frisks and whether separate analyses applied to each type of
action. Chief Justice Warren focused entirely on frisks, declining to
address whether investigatory seizures, or stops, "upon less than
probable cause" were constitutional because he felt it was not clear
that such a stop had occurred in that case.99 In two separate
concurrences, however, Justices Harlan and White asserted that a
valid stop is a prerequisite to a valid frisk. 0° Justice Harlan opined
that in order for an officer to be justified in frisking an individual
during an encounter, he must first have constitutional grounds upon
which to base the encounter.1 1 An officer exercising constitutional
authority to detain and question a hostile individual would also
necessarily have the authority to frisk the detainee so as to protect
himself .'0 Justice White agreed, stating that the temporary stop,
"warranted by the circumstances," justifies the frisk. 03 Under the
proper circumstances, Justice White believed, a person could be
detained briefly against his will while an officer asked him
questions.'04
(describing the function of the Fourth Amendment). Regardless of whether probable
cause exists to arrest a suspect, the Court concluded that the police should be permitted to
conduct a reasonable search for weapons when there is reason to believe that the suspect
is armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
96. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. at 19 n.16 (stating that the Court could not tell, based on the record, whether
the officer had detained the suspects either by physical force or by show of authority); see
also Dudley, supra note 94, at 895-96 (noting Chief Justice Warren's "instinct" to separate
the "frisk" and "stop" issues in Terry and discussing the debates among the Justices that
led to footnote 16 in Terry).
100. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34-35 (White, J.,
concurring).
101. See id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 32, 34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
104. See id. (White, J., concurring).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Court dodged the stop and frisk issue in two other cases1 5
before finally addressing it four years after Terry in Adams v.
Williams.0 6 The Adams Court implicitly adopted Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Terry,07 stating that "[s]o long as the officer is entitled
to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in
scope to this protective purpose."'0" Three years later, the Court
explicitly adopted the rationale of Justice Harlan's Terry concurrence
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.0 9 The Brignoni-Ponce Court held
the stop in that case to be unconstitutional and acknowledged its
adoption of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry, stating that
Terry and Adams "together establish that in appropriate
circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited
'search' or 'seizure' on facts that do not constitute probable cause to
105. The Court had its first opportunity to apply the Terry Doctrine in two companion
cases handed down in a combined opinion on the same day as Terry. See Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Both cases involved
investigatory stop situations rather than frisks, but the Court found other grounds upon
which to decide them. In Sibron, the Court held that the search of a suspected drug dealer
was invalid because the officer's testimony clearly established that the search was for
drugs, not weapons. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64-66. In Peters, the Court held that the
officer had probable cause to arrest the suspect for burglary based on the officer's
observations of the defendant furtively tiptoeing through a building. See Peters, id. at 66.
Because probable cause existed, Terry was inapplicable. See id.
106. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The defendant in Adams brought a habeas corpus challenge
after being convicted of illegally possessing a handgun that an officer found during a stop
and frisk. See iL at 144. At about 2:15 a.m., an informant told the police officer that an
individual in a nearby car was carrying drugs and a gun. See id. at 144-45. When the
officer approached the car and asked Williams to open the door, he rolled down the
window instead. See id. at 145. The officer, without seeing a weapon, immediately
reached into the car where he thought a gun might be and extracted one. See id. Williams
claimed that the officer's actions were illegal because he based them merely on a tip from
an informant. See id. The officer contended that his suspicion was reasonable because he
knew the informant, it was dark and the officer could not see inside the car, the defendant
did not obey his command, and it was extremely late at night. See id. at 146-48. Based on
these factors, the Court upheld the officer's action. See id at 149.
107. See Terry, 392 US. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra text
accompanying notes 100-02 (noting Justice Harlan's concurrence).
108. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
109. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Brignoni-Ponce involved a defendant who was arrested by a
border patrol officer while attempting to shuttle illegal aliens into the United States. See
id. at 874-75. The defendant challenged the U.S. Border Patrol's authority to stop cars
and question the occupants about their citizenship while on a roving patrol near the
border. See id. at 874. The defendant's car was stopped only because the occupants
appeared to be of Mexican descent. See id- at 875. Other than the apparent ethnicity of
the occupants, there were no specific, articulable facts on which the officers based the
stop. See id. at 885. The Court, therefore, held the investigatory stop to be invalid. See id.
at 885-87.
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arrest or to search for contraband or evidence of crime."110 Further,
the Court held that "[a]s in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation.' "I"
From the stop and frisk exceptions to the "monolithic" Fourth
Amendment approach, a two-part test has emerged in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. With respect to stops, the test is whether a reasonably
cautious police officer, based on the totality of the circumstances, has
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."
After a valid stop has occurred, the test as to the validity of a frisk is
whether, under the same conditions, the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous."
3
The Court has since decided several cases further defining the
principles of Terry. In Ybarra v. Illinois,"4 the Court held that the
requisite suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts, that
the suspicion must associated with the specific individual, and that the
suspicion does not automatically arise merely from the individual's
location."5 Two years after Ybarra, in United States v. Cortez,"16 the
Court focused on the necessity of considering all of the circumstances
observed by police." 7 The Court held that two elements must be
110. Id. at 881.
111. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
112. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-46. The North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted
this same test. See State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992); State v.
Peck, 305 N.C. 734,741,291 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1982).
113. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-46. North Carolina courts follow the same standard.
See Butler, 331 N.C. at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722; Peck, 305 N.C. at 741, 291 S.E.2d at 641.
114. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
115. See id at 91, 93. The defendant in Ybarra was a patron at a small tavern for which
a search warrant was issued. Id. at 88-89. The police had obtained the warrant because
they suspected that the bartender possessed drugs and planned to sell them from the
tavern. See id at 88. When the police served the warrant, the defendant was patted down
along with all the other bar patrons. See id. at 88-89. The Court held that proximity to
criminal suspects does not rise to the level of a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry
frisk. See id. at 92.
116. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
117. See id. at 417-18. Cortez involved the constitutionality of investigative stops of
suspected illegal aliens by U.S. Border Patrol agents. Id. at 415-16. After observing some
distinctive footprints in the Arizona desert, Border Patrol officers suspected that an
ongoing criminal operation was guiding illegal aliens across the United States-Mexico
border. See id. at 413-14. The officers stationed themselves where they thought the
suspects might turn up and spotted a vehicle matching the profile. See id. at 415-16. The
profile focused on trucks and other large vehicles travelling back and forth on a particular
road after midnight. See id. at 414-15. The defendants were driving a pickup truck with a
camper shell and passed the patrol at 4:30 a.m. headed toward a milepost where
unauthorized border crossings had occurred. See id. at 415. The truck returned
approximately 90 minutes later. See id. The court, based on these circumstances, held
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present before either a stop or a frisk by police is permissible. First,
in analyzing a situation, a police officer must consider all the
surrounding circumstances, including, but not limited to, objective
observations, any prior police records of the suspect(s), and
knowledge of patterns or modus operandi of certain types of
criminals.1 The Cortez Court examined cases decided since Terry
and concluded that "the essence of all that has been written is that the
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account."119 From these factors, the officer is allowed to draw
inferences as a trained person in the field of law enforcement. 2 1
Second, the officer's analysis must generate a "particularized
suspicion" that the person is involved in some sort of crime-for a
stop-or is armed and dangerous-for a frisk. The Court
summarized the standard, stating, "[b]ased upon [the] whole picture
the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. '12'
The North Carolina Supreme Court first applied a Terry analysis
in State v. Streeter." Police stopped and frisked George Streeter after
spotting him walking in a business district late at night with a bulge
under his shirt."23  The Streeter court followed Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Terry by applying the reasonable, articulable suspicion
standard to an investigative stop situation.1 24 The court held that if
that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspects were engaged in
criminal activity. See id at 421-22.
118. See id. at 418.
119. Id at417.
120. See id. at 418.
121. Id at 417-18.
122. 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973); see also infra note 141 (noting that Terry was
mentioned, but did not apply, in two North Carolina cases decided before Streeter).
123. See Streeter, 283 N.C. at 208, 195 S.E.2d at 505. A patrolling officer approached
Streeter at approximately 2:45 a.m. to determine his reason for being near several
businesses and noticed a bulge under his shirt. See id. Thinking it was a revolver, the
officer frisked the defendant and found burglary tools. See id.
124. Id at 210, 195 S.E.2d at 507; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (arguing that a constitutional stop must precede a constitutional frisk);
supra notes 100-02 (discussing the concurrence). Quoting Terry, the North Carolina court
recognized the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and the general
public in situations when probable cause is lacking. See Streeter, 283 N.C. at 209-10, 195
S.E.2d at 506 (quoting Tenry, 392 U.S. at 19, 24). The court concluded that the actions of
the officer were "entirely reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards" and that evidence
"exposed by [such a] limited weapons search is ... lawfully obtained, and neither the
Fourth Amendment nor [state law] excludes it." Id at 210, 195 S.E.2d at 507. The dissent
in Streeter agreed with the application of Terry, but did not agree on the outcome. See id
at 211-12, 195 S.E.2d at 507-08 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
Instead, Justice Higgins argued that the circumstances did not rise to the level required to
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the totality of the circumstances leads an officer to believe criminal
activity is afoot, the officer may stop the suspect temporarily.'25 Once
a suspect has been stopped, if the officer's suspicions of criminal
activity are confirmed and the officer has further reason to believe
the suspect may be armed and dangerous, a frisk is permissible. 2 6
Since Streeter, North Carolina courts have, for the most part,
continued to follow this traditional formulation of the Terry
analysis. 27
Viewed in light of this precedent, the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Pearson appears inconsistent with traditional
formulations of the Terry Doctrine and with the approach taken in
McClendon. Specifically, three problems emerge from an analysis of
the cases: First, the court in Pearson mistakenly applied the Terry
stop analysis to a frisk situation." Second, the court failed to
consider properly the totality of the circumstances in Pearson.29
Lastly, the Pearson and McClendon courts inconsistently evaluated
the importance of the suspects' nervousness.'
The first problem is with the test that the North Carolina
Supreme Court applied in Pearson. After noting that the case
focused on the validity of the frisk, the court stated the Terry
Doctrine as: "When an officer observes conduct which leads him
reasonably to believe that criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop
the suspicious person to make reasonable inquiries. If he reasonably
believes that the person is armed and dangerous, the officer may frisk
the person to discover a weapon . . . ,,3 This passage is a proper
restatement of the Terry Doctrine because a valid stop is a
prerequisite to a valid frisk."2 Nevertheless, the court went on to
state: "We cannot hold that the circumstances considered as a whole
warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot or that the
justify a frisk. See i& at 212, 195 S.E.2d at 508 (Higgins, J., dissenting) ("This sort of
search is described by the Supreme Court of the United States in these words: 'A general
exploratory rummaging.'" (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971))).
125. See Streeter, 283 N.C. at 210,195 S.E.2d at 507.
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233-34, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722-23 (1992)
(following the traditional Terry analysis); State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. App. 84, 89, 478 S.E.2d
789,792 (1996) (same); State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237,239,468 S.E.2d 833,835 (1996)
(same).
128. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
131. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 600.
132. See supra notes 100,106-13 and accompanying text.
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defendant was armed and dangerous."'33 Furthermore, according to
the court, the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath "should not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."' 4 Finally, the
Pearson court noted that "[t]he variance in the statements of the
defendant and his fianc6e did not show that there was criminal
activity afoot."' 35 The court used this same language in McClendon to
explain its holding in Pearson: "[The circumstances in Pearson] were
not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.'13 6
These statements indicate an application of the Terry stop
analysis, not the Terry frisk analysis. The validity of Trooper
Cardwell's actions in pulling Pearson over, however, was not before
the court.37 Instead of focusing on whether criminal activity was
133. Pearson, 348 N.C, at 276,498 S.E.2d at 600 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 638,517 S.E.2d at 133-34 (emphasis added).
137. See State v. Pearson, 125 N.C. App. 676, 679, 482 S.E.2d 16, 17-18 (1998), rev'd,
348 N.C. 272,498 S.E.2d 599 (1998). Trooper Cardwell pulled over Pearson because of his
erratic driving. See id, at 678, 482 S.E.2d at 17. Even though the issue was not raised on
appeal, there is some question, based on precedent, as to whether this stop was valid.
North Carolina courts have recognized that traveling below the posted speed limit and
weaving within one's lane may give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of a
vehicle to investigate whether the driver is impaired, in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
138.1 (1999). In State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989), the court used a
"reasonable and experienced" police officer standard to hold that driving 20 miles below
the speed limit and weaving were sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion. See id. at
395, 386 S.E.2d at 221. On its facts, Jones is the North Carolina precedent closest to the
fact situation in Pearson prior to the traffic stop. Yet, neither the court of appeals nor the
supreme court mentioned how far below the speed limit Pearson was driving. If Pearson
was travelling closer to the speed limit than the defendant was in Jones, he might have
been able to argue successfully that the evidence should have been excluded because the
initial stop was invalid. If the initial stop was invalid, the Terry frisk following the stop
also could be held invalid, as any evidence gathered would be tainted by an unlawful
seizure. See id. at 394, 386 S.E.2d at 220; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, § 7, at 604.
Even assuming that the initial traffic stop was valid, an issue still remains as to the
constitutionality of the questioning that occurred after Trooper Cardwell ascertained that
Pearson was not under the influence and issued him a warning ticket. The defendant
could have argued that, once the trooper decided issued the ticket, a separate finding of
"reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity being afoot" was required to sustain
further detention and questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Villota-Gomez, 994 F. Supp.
1322, 1327-28 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 539-40 (10th
Cir. 1994), to describe the acceptable ways in which an officer may further question an
individual once an initial traffic stop has been completed). If the courts agreed with such
reasoning, any evidence gathered in the subsequent frisk could be subject to the
exclusionary rule, just as it would be if the original traffic stop were held to be invalid. See
idt; see also supra note 2 (discussing the exclusionary rule).
Pearson did argue during the suppression hearing that the original stop was
unreasonably long. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 44, Pearson, State of North
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afoot, the court should have determined whether the factors
considered would lead a reasonably cautious police officer to suspect
that Pearson was armed and dangerous. In fact, Pearson's attorney
focused on this issue in his brief to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, arguing that "[t]here was not the slightest suggestion in the
record that defendant posed a danger to anyone.' '1 38
This mistake is important because asking whether criminal
activity is afoot does not always yield the same answer as asking
whether a suspect is armed and dangerous. Criminal activity does not
necessarily involve weapons. Thus, the reasonable, articulable
suspicion required for a stop should not necessarily justify a frisk.
While the court may well have reached the same result in Pearson if it
had used the correct test, confusing the two tests could be
determinative in other cases.
The second notable problem is the way in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Pearson evaluated the circumstances
upon which Trooper Cardwell based his suspicion. An appellate
court in a Terry case is allowed considerable discretion in interpreting
the facts because the legal determination of the existence of a
reasonable, articulable suspicion is subject to de novo review.139 The
Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Guilford County (No. 94 CRS
68468-69). The presiding judge, however, concluded that only 10 to 12 minutes had passed
from the initial stop until the consent to the search of Pearson's car. See id. at 52. Based
on this elapsed time, the judge concluded the length of the stop was not unreasonable. See
id. Pearson did not challenge this ruling before the appellate court.
138. Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 498 S.E.2d 599 (1998)
(No. 165PA97).
139. The facts contained in the "totality of the circumstances" analysis are subject to
clear error review. See United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869,
871 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 1984) (en
bane)). In other words, the factual findings by lower courts are viewed with great
deference and are set aside only if "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395 (1948). The legal conclusions based on those
findings, however, are reviewed de novo with no deference to lower courts' holdings. See
Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109; Perrin, 45 F.3d at 871. This de novo review is different from the
standard used in determinations of probable cause when a warrant has been issued.
Probable cause determinations by magistrates are not subject to de novo review, but
instead are subject to a determination of whether "'the evidence as a whole provided a
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause.'" State v. Barnhardt, 92 N.C. App. 94,
96, 373 S.E.2d 461, 462 (1988) (quoting State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 640, 319 S.E.2d
254, 258 (1984)). The difference between review of a Terry case and the review of an
issuance of a warrant is rooted in the courts' preference for the warrant process because
"it provides an orderly procedure involving judicial impartiality whereby 'a neutral and
detached magistrate' can make 'informed and deliberate determinations' on the issue of
probable cause." Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965)).
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traditional Terry analysis requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances rather than evaluating each circumstance in isolation
from the others. 14  North Carolina courts have followed the
traditional "totality" test since the state's first in-depth 41 Terry
analysis in State v. Streeter. 42 The McClendon opinion continued this
tradition by considering the totality of the circumstances,' 43 but the
Pearson opinion considered each circumstance in isolation and, thus,
failed to apply the totality test properly.' 44
In Pearson, the court searched for individual factors that would
be sufficient in themselves to lead a reasonable observer to believe
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.145 Although the
Pearson court professed to have considered the circumstances as a
whole and began its opinion by briefly reviewing the facts considered
by the court of appeals, 46 the court proceeded to examine each
Because a police officer makes the initial determination regarding the existence of a
reasonable, articulable suspicion in the field, this judicial impartiality is not present in
Terry situations. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). As a result, the preference
accorded to probable cause determinations by magistrates does not transfer to reviews of
Terry analyses. See Glenn, 152 F.3d at 1048 (stating the de novo review standard); Leshuk,
65 F.3d at 1109 (same); Perrin, 45 F.3d at 871 (same).
140. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
141. State v. Woody, 277 N.C. 646, 178 S.E.2d 407 (1971), and State v. Robinson, 15
N.C. App. 155, 189 S.E.2d 567 (1972), both preceded Streeter and cited Terry as authority.
Neither case, however, utilized the Terry analysis. Woody involved a search incident to a
lawful arrest; although the court cited Terry, it was not clear why Terry was controlling
precedent. Compare Woody, 277 N.C. at 652, 178 S.E.2d at 410 (stating that probable
cause for the defendant's arrest existed and that the search was incident to the arrest), with
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968) (stating that Terry is inapplicable in situations
where police have probable cause for an arrest). In Robinson, Terry was mentioned only
in dicta, as the court noted that the search in the case was not challenged as an
unreasonable investigatory stop. See Robinson, 15 N.C. App. at 156,189 S.E.2d at 568.
142. State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203,210, 195 S.E.2d 502,507 (1973).
143. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 637,517 S.E.2d at 133.
144. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 600-01 (scrutinizing every factor
considered by the lower court and finding that none supported a reasonable, articulable
suspicion); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) ("[T]he State is unable to
articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even
suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous."). Ybarra's language also differs
somewhat from the traditional "totality of the circumstances" test set forth by the Terry
Court and later restated in cases such as United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. The
Ybarra majority's opinion did, in fact, meet with dissent, as Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist argued that the majority "overlook[ed] the practicalities
of the situation" in holding that the search was invalid in that case. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 97
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
145. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276,498 S.E.2d at 601.
146. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 600 ("We cannot hold that the
circumstances considered as a whole warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was
afoot or that the defendant was armed and dangerous.").
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circumstance individually.'47 The Pearson court's examination of
individual facts may stem from a misreading of Terry. To be sure, the
Terry Court used the same technique,"t 8 but after discounting every
circumstance individually in that case, the Court took an additional
step and added the elements together to determine what sort of
picture the cumulative facts painted.149
In contrast to the Pearson analysis, the McClendon court focused
on the totality of the circumstances.150 The court viewed the
circumstances only in combination with each other, never discounting
or exclusively analyzing the factors individually as it had done in
Pearson.'51 The difference in these two approaches to the Terry
analysis is illustrated in the State's brief to the North Carolina
Supreme Court in McClendon. There, the assistant attorney general
noted that the defendant's "analytical approach is piecemeal: they
dissect the circumstances and explain them singly in a way consistent
with innocence and with no recognition that the circumstances
considered as a whole could also be consistent with criminal
activity." 52 The State's brief argued that "the more appropriate
perspective as taught by Terry is not to consider the acts separately
... [but] to consider whether the acts taken together warrant further
investigation notwithstanding that individually they may appear
innocuous."' 53 The opinion in Pearson wrongly suggested that the
facts exclusively should be analyzed and argued individually.
As Terry and subsequent cases have recognized, the fundamental
reason for viewing the circumstances together is that multiple,
seemingly innocuous factors can create a reasonable, articulable
suspicion justifying a stop or frisk when viewed collectively. 5 4 As one
trial court has noted, "[i]ndividually, any of the factors cited [in a
Terry case] might not justify a search, but one cannot piecemeal this
analysis. One piece of sand may not make a beach, but courts will not
be made to look at each grain in isolation and conclude there is no
147. See id. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 601.
148. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968).
149. See iL
150. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 639,517 S.E.2d at 134.
151. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 600-01.
152. Brief for Appellee at 26, State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999)
(No. 392A98).
153. Id. at 26-27.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 525 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968);
State v. Andrews, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (Ohio 1991).
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seashore."'55  Admittedly, a cumulative evaluation of the facts in
Pearson probably would not have supported a reasonable, articulable
suspicion.56 It is clear, however, that the court did not apply the
155. Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Police officers
in this case frisked the defendant after they stopped the automobile in which she was a
passenger. See icL at 501.
156. Because Pearson's frisk was at issue, Terry requires that Trooper Cardwell had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Pearson was armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 27. There appears to have been no such suspicion or supporting articulated facts in the
case, although the opinion is somewhat vague on that point because the supreme court did
not fully address the issue, focusing instead on the suspicion of criminal activity. See supra
notes 46-48, 131-38.
The transcript of the suppression hearing in Pearson suggests that Trooper
Cardwell suspected that Pearson could have been, among other things, trafficking drugs.
See Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 8, Pearson, State of North Carolina General Court
of Justice, Superior Court Division, Guilford County (No. 94 CRS 68468-69) (noting that
Trooper Cardwell asked Pearson if he had any drugs, weapons, or stolen property in his
car). The frisk of Pearson flowed from the search of the vehicle, where one would expect
to find any large quantities of drugs being transported. Considering the language in Terry
allowing an officer to use his experience in viewing the totality of the circumstances, such
circumstances could add up to substantive suspicion of a crime at some point even if each
circumstance is meaningless individually. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. However, the record
shows that Trooper Cardwell never specifically articulated that he had suspected Pearson
of running drugs in either the suppression hearing or the trial. If Trooper Cardwell had
done so and had supported the suspicion with his experience and observations of Pearson,
the State may have had a plausible argument that the frisk was reasonable. A number of
jurisdictions have upheld similar officer conduct in cases dealing with suspected
transportation of large quantities of drugs based on the reasoning that weapons are "tools
of the drug trade." See, e.g., United States v. Woodall, 938 F.2d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that police information identifying a suspect of manufacturing drugs and as being
involved with a narcotics dealer justified a frisk); United States v. Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424
(11th Cir. 1989) (upholding a frisk based on the fact that police observed the defendant
with a known drug dealer who met with another dealer in order to exchange drugs);
United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling that police actions
were justified when officers frisked the defendant after finding a large sum of money,
suspected to come from drug dealings, on him, because "persons involved with drugs often
carry weapons"); United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding
weapons frisks, during a seizure, of defendants suspected of major drug trafficking);
United States v. Vasquez, 634 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that frisks of defendants
involved in major drug trafficking are valid, especially in light of the "violent nature of
narcotics crime"); United States v. Cotton, 708 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D. Tenn. 1989)
(upholding frisks of suspects involved in "substantial" drug activities because such
individuals may be armed and dangerous); Caffie v. State, 516 So. 2d 822, 828 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986) ("We recognize that under certain circumstances, for example, where the
authorities are dealing with an individual suspected of trafficking in large quantities of
narcotics, they may be authorized to automatically frisk the suspect."), affd sub nom. Ex
parte Caffie, 516 So. 2d 831, 837 (Ala. 1987); Williams v. Commonwealth, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87
(Va. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that police may frisk individuals suspected of either drug
distribution or possession); see also David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical
Judgment: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 975, 1002-03 n.111 (1998) (listing additional cases with similar
holdings).
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Terry analysis consistently and that the discrepancy could be
determinative in some cases. Pearson's piecemeal approach has the
potential to undermine police authority in quickly developing street
conditions, lead to analytical confusion among lower courts, and send
an inconsistent message to defendants as to how the facts of each case
will be analyzed. These results are particularly unfortunate because
the court had another means at its disposal for achieving the same
result in Pearson. The court could have held that, while the totality of
circumstances may have justified a suspicion of criminal activity-
and, thus, the initial stop-the circumstances did not support a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Pearson was armed and
dangerous-and, thus, the subsequent frisk.
Finally, McClendon and Pearson are inconsistent in their
treatment of a suspect's nervousness as a possible ground for
suspicion. North Carolina appellate courts have had several
opportunities to deal with nervousness displayed by suspects. In State
v. Butler,"7 for example, police spotted the suspect in a high drug-
crime area; the suspect walked away suspiciously after making eye
contact with the officers. 8 The supreme court held that the resulting
investigatory stop was valid based on the totality of the
circumstances, 159 citing a Louisiana case in which the court had held
that a suspect's nervousness alone could be a basis for reasonable
suspicion.' ° Four years later in State v. Rhyne, 6' police frisked a
suspect after receiving a tip that there were drug dealers in the area
where he was spotted.'62 Although the North Carolina Court of
Appeals considered the suspect's nervousness, it held the search to be
invalid because the suspect did not display any other suspicious
behavior. 63
157. 331 N.C. 227,415 S.E.2d 719 (1992).
158. See id at 233-34,415 S.E.2d at 722-23.
159. See iL at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722.
160. See id. at 234, 415 S.E.2d at 723 (citing State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La.
1983)).
161. 124 N.C. App. 84,478 S.E.2d 789 (1996).
162. See id. at 85-86, 478 S.E.2d at 790.
163. See idL at 90-91, 478 S.E.2d at 792-93. In another recent case involving Trooper
Cardwell, State v. Falana, 129 N.C. App. 813, 501 S.E.2d 358 (1998), the court of appeals
followed the supreme court's opinion in Pearson and held that the defendant's nervous
conduct and vague travel plans did not rise to the level of a reasonable, articulable
suspicion. See i. at 817, 501 S.E.2d at 360. The facts in Falana apparently were not as
damaging as those in Pearson. Trooper Cardwell testified that the defendant in Falana
was breathing rapidly and periodically paused in his speech to swallow. See id. at 815, 501
S.E.2d at 359. Moreover, the stories given by the defendant and his passenger contained
only minor discrepancies in comparison to Pearson. The stop took place on Wednesday;
Falana stated that the couple had been in New Jersey visiting friends for three days, see id.
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In light of this precedent, it seems anomalous that the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Pearson stated that "[t]he nervousness of
the defendant [was] not significant. Many people become nervous
when stopped by a state trooper."'" The plain meaning of this
statement appears to be that the court would not consider mere
nervousness in evaluating the existence of a reasonable, articulable
suspicion. In McClendon, however, the court emphasized the
defendant's nervousness and, at the same time, tried to clarify its
holding in Pearson. The McClendon court concluded that Pearson's
nervousness had not risen to a significant level16 and explained that
the Pearson opinion "did not mean to imply ... that nervousness can
never be significant in determining whether an officer could form a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."'" In fact, both
the court of appeals and supreme court held that McClendon's
nervousness was so pronounced that it was reasonable to consider in
the totality of the circumstances.1 7 The supreme court explained that
Pearson's nervousness "was not remarkable... [but that McClendon]
exhibited more than ordinary nervousness.1 68  In arriving at this
conclusion, however, the court merely listed the factors in
McClendon's stop that were discussed by the court of appeals 69
without specifically comparing those factors to the fact pattern in
Pearson.
The McClendon court's effort to distinguish Pearson is
problematic for two reasons. First, the supreme court admitted in
McClendon that it had not considered Pearson's nervousness as part
of the totality of the circumstances in that case. The court tried to
downplay this mistake by stating that "[e]ven when taken together
with the [other circumstances in Pearson], it did not support a
reasonable suspicion.""7 0 This belated conclusion, however, does not
make up for the fact that the court did not properly consider
Pearson's nervousness and leaves a lingering issue for future litigants.
Even if Pearson's nervousness, properly considered, would not have
amounted to a reasonable suspicion, the Pearson opinion's analysis of
at 814, 501 S.E.2d at 359, while Falana's girlfriend stated that the couple had been in the
same state for the same purpose since "Saturday or Sunday," id. at 815, 501 S.E.2d at 359.
164. Pearson, 348 N.C. at 276,498 S.E.2d at 601.
165. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 639,517 S.E.2d at 134.
166. Id. at 638, 517 S.E.2d at 134.
167. See id. at 639, 517 S.E.2d at 134; State v. McClendon, 130 N.C. App. 368, 378, 502
S.E.2d 902,908 (1998), affd, 350 N.C. 630,517 S.E.2d 128 (1999).
168. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 639,517 S.E.2d at 134.
169. See id. at 637-39,517 S.E.2d at 133-34.
170. Id at 639, 517 S.E.2d at 134.
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the factor should serve as a warning flag for future Terry cases. In
trying to justify its analysis in Pearson, the court appears to have
concluded that a suspect's nervousness would have to meet some
unspecified threshold before it would be considered within the
totality of the circumstances. Terry and its progeny, however, do not
require such a threshold. Instead, the cases hold that, if the
circumstance existed and was noticed by the officer, it should be
considered by the court as part of the totality of the circumstances.'7'
Second, the difference between Pearson's and McClendon's
nervousness is not clear and could very well be far less than the
McClendon opinion suggested. Much of the detail regarding
McClendon's nervousness comes from the work of the State's
attorney at the suppression hearing, in which he had Trooper
Cardwell itemize several times McClendon's physical characteristics
and behavior during the original stop.' While the supreme court in
McClendon reasoned that Pearson's nervousness was not remarkable,
both troopers in Pearson testified that he exhibited increasing
nervousness throughout the traffic stop and subsequent questioning,
describing him as "very nervous and excited.' 173  Neither side at
Pearson's suppression hearing elicited testimony regarding the
specific physical characteristics of his nervousness. In McClendon, on
the other hand, the supreme court described McClendon as
"extremely nervous."'174 Based on this record, it is difficult to tell
whether McClendon really was more nervous than Pearson, or
whether the court merely received a more detailed description of
171. See supra notes 97-98, 116-21, 154-56 and accompanying text.
172. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 104, 110, McClendon, State of North
Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Guilford County (Nos. 96
CRS 22468, 96 CRS 28944, 96 CRS 28945); Telephone Interview with Walter L. Jones,
supra note 73.
173. State v. Pearson, 125 N.C. App. 676, 678-79, 482 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1998), rev'd, 348
N.C. 272, 498 S.E.2d 599 (1998). The court of appeals in McClendon also emphasized the
difference in Pearson's and McClendon's nervousness, stating that the circumstances in
McClendon "extend[ed] well beyond those found in Pearson." McClendon, 130 N.C. App.
368, 378, 502 S.E.2d 902, 908 (1998), affd, 350 N.C. 630, 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999). In
reviewing the factors in both cases, however, there appears to be little difference. The
similarities include: (1) the defendants were pulled over for a minor traffic violation; (2)
Trooper Cardwell pulled over the suspects in both cases; (3) the stops occurred on
Interstate 85 in Guilford County in the afternoon; (4) the defendants acted nervous when
questioned by the trooper; (5) the defendants' replies to Trooper Cardwell's questions
were vague and inconsistent; (6) the defendants were only issued a traffic warning; (7) and
Trooper Cardwell held the defendants after the warnings were issued and asked for
consent to search the cars. See Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274-75, 498 S.E.2d at 599-600;
McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 369-74,502 S.E.2d at 903-06.
174. McClendon, 350 N.C. at 637,517 S.E.2d at 133.
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McClendon's nervousness because of the prosecutor's efforts at the
suppression hearing. The prosecutor in McClendon questioned
Trooper Cardwell extensively about the defendant's physical
characteristics. 75 This extensive questioning and the resulting record
translated to extensive reviews and evaluations in the court of
appeals" 76 and supreme court's"7 opinions in McClendon. It seems
that the courts, bound by the trial court's findings, treated the
detailed description of McClendon's physical appearance as evidence
of greater nervousness than the defendant's in Pearson.
Taken together, Pearson and McClendon seem likely to lead
North Carolina courts to focus even more attention on parsing the
particular degree of nervousness required in order to consider the
factor relevant to a Terry analysis. Yet considering the traditional
Terry analysis and its directive to consider all of the circumstances,
such a threshold test would be improper. The reviewing courts are
bound by the trial court records in evaluating factors such as
nervousness, but the inconsistent treatment of nervousness within the
totality of the circumstances could lead to problems for defense and
prosecuting attorneys in predicting the factor's importance. Unless
North Carolina courts clarify their treatment of nervousness in Terry
cases, attorneys on both sides probably will have to ensure that
thorough and extremely detailed descriptions of the nervous
characteristics of defendants are entered into the records of their
cases. Inconsistent treatment of nervousness also could create
problems for police in weighing the nervousness of suspects
encountered in the field and determining when such characteristics
rise to the requisite level under Terry.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decisions in Pearson and
McClendon demonstrate the difficulties in applying the Terry
Doctrine to different fact patterns. Some of the confusion stems from
the subjective nature of the balancing test itself. The line between
175. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 104, 110, McClendon; Telephone
Interview with Walter L. Jones, supra note 73.
176. See McClendon, 130 N.C. App. at 369-78, 502 S.E.2d at 903-08 (recounting
McClendon's physical characteristics, including the sweat beading on his forehead and his
trembling hands).
177. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 637, 639, 517 S.E.2d at 134 (recounting McClendon's
sweating, rapid breathing, and heavy sighing).
178. See iL at 639, 517 S.E.2d at 134 (comparing McClendon's nervousness to
Pearson's); Pearson, 348 N.C. at 274, 498 S.E.2d at 599 (containing a very limited
description and consideration of Pearson's nervousness); Transcript of Motion to Suppress
at 6, 33, Pearson, State of North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court
Division, Guilford County (No. 94 CRS 68468-69) (noting Trooper Cardwell's brief
description of Pearson's nervousness).
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what is and what is not a reasonable, articulable suspicion is often
blurred. The United States Supreme Court in Terry and its progeny
has provided various analytical tools to help lower courts in their
balancing process and in determining the existence of reasonable,
articulable suspicion.17 9  By trying to distinguish Pearson from
McClendon, the North Carolina Supreme Court has created some
confusion about how Terry should be applied. As between the two
cases, McClendon is more in line with the traditional Terry analysis.
To clarify the doctrine's status further, it would be helpful for the
court to: (1) apply the correct Terry analysis and associated language,
depending on the issue at hand-a stop, frisk, or both; (2) consider
the totality of the circumstances as a whole in every case and refrain
from evaluating factors individually without considering their
cumulative impact; and (3) consider a suspect's nervousness
consistently as a part of the totality of the circumstances. Although
fact-specific inquiries into the reasonableness of officers' suspicions
will always be intricate, North Carolina courts and litigants would
benefit significantly from a more consistent application of the Terry
Doctrine.
ROBERT G. LINDAUER, JR.
179. See supra notes 93-94,96-97, 112-21 and accompanying text.
